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TAGS: OVIP RICE CONDOLEEZZA PREL PARM MARR JA
SUBJECT: (S) Secretary Rice's February 27, 2008 Meeting
with Japanese Defense Minister Ishiba

DOD FOR APSA SHIN/SEDNEY/HILL/BASALLA JOINT STAFF FOR J-5 USFJ FOR J00/J01/J-5

- (U) Classified by: Uzra Zeya, Deputy Executive Secretary, S/ES, Department of State. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
- 11. (U) February 27, 2008; 3:15 p.m.; Tokyo, Japan.
- 12. (U) Participants:

United States
The Secretary
Amb. J. Thomas Schieffer
Lt Gen William Fraser III, Assistant to the Chairman, JCS
NSC Senior Director for East Asian Affairs Dennis Wilder
A/S Sean McCormack, PA
LTG Edward A. Rice, Jr., Commander, U.S. Forces Japan
Sangmin Lee (Embassy Notetaker)

JAPAN
Shigeru Ishiba, Minister of Defense
Kohei Masuda, Administrative Vice Minister of Defense
Nobushige Takamizawa, Director General, Defense Policy
Bureau
Hideshi Tokuchi, Director General, Operational Policy
Bureau
LTG Koji Shimohira, Vice Chief of Staff, Joint Staff
Masaru Tsuji, Director General for International Affairs
Kiyoshi Serizawa, Director, Japan-U.S. Defense
Cooperation Division
Ryo Matsumoto, Deputy Director, Japan-U.S. Defense
Cooperation Division (Notetaker)

13. (S) SUMMARY: In a February 27 meeting with the Secretary, Japanese Defense Minister Ishiba reaffirmed his commitment to implement U.S. Forces realignment, stressing that Japan and the United States should begin to discuss steps for strengthening deterrence at a level commensurate with current bilateral disQssions on burden reduction. The Secretary expressed deep regret for the alleged February 10 rape of a young girl by a U.S. Marine in Okinawa and urged the Japanese government to implement realignment as agreed. The Secretary also reaffirmed the strategic importance of the bilateral alliance and stressed that the Six-Party process would not negatively affect it. Ishiba and the Secretary praised the strong bilateral cooperation on ballistic missile defense (BMD) and acknowledged the difficulties of engaging Russia on its negative view of U.S.-Japan BMD cooperation. END SUMMARY.

DPRI WILL PROCEED, NEED DISCUSSION ON DETERRENCE

14. (C) Ishiba asserted that he was committed to implementing alliance transformation and realignment of U.S. Forces under the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) according to the agreed timeline and implementation plan. The two countries, however, needed to have more dialogue on specific measures for

strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance's deterrence capability since discussions on burden reduction have outpaced those on deterrence. This was particularly important in light of the fluid security environment in Northeast Asia, Ishiba stressed.

15. (C) The Secretary thanked Ishiba for stating publicly his commitment to Okinawa consolidation per the agreed plan, noting that DPRI was a crucial element in modernizing the Alliance. Both sides have already made great efforts to strengthen the Alliance. It was, therefore, important to continue to push forward on realignment and discuss how this would augment our deterrence capability.

SEXUAL ASSAULT CASE REGRETTABLE, VIS-A-VIS REALIGNMENT

16. (C) Ishiba said the alleged February 10 sexual assault of a young girl by a U.S. Marine in Okinawa was regrettable, particularly in light of the two countries' realignment agenda. It was important for both governments to respond to such incidents in a timely manner and demonstrate sincerity in their approach to resolving issues in Okinawa. In this regard, the Japanese government greatly appreciated the recent visit to Okinawa by Ambassador Schieffer and former USFJ Commander LTG Wright, Ishiba added.

 $\underline{\mbox{\bf 1}} \mbox{\bf 7.}$ (C) The Secretary responded that the U.S. government

deeply regretted the incident, adding that she had stated in her press interview earlier in the day that she sympathized with the victim and her family. Acknowledging the hard work of both governments in responding to the incident -- including the visit to Okinawa by the Ambassador and LTG Wright -- she also expressed confidence that the bilateral task force on incidents involving the U.S. military ought to be able to improve mechanisms for preventing recurrences.

REFUELING OPS RESUME, PUSH FOR PERMANENT DISPATCH LAW

18. (C) Ishiba briefed the Secretary on the resumption of Japanese refueling operations in the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). He said he had explained to Diet members who opposed the passage of the new anti-terror special measures law authorizing the refueling operations that Japan would be singled out among G-8 countries as the only one that did not contribute to the War on Terrorism were it not for OEF. He also noted the importance of passing permanent legislation authorizing the overseas dispatch of Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in light of current restrictions on overseas deployment imposed by special measures laws. Ishiba said he did not know when the permanent dispatch legislation would be submitted to the Diet, but would continue to push for its passage.

REAFFIRM IMPORTANCE OF U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

19. (S) Acknowledging Ishiba's point on the evolving security environment in Northeast Asia, the Secretary reaffirmed the strategic importance of our Alliance. Efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party process notwithstanding, U.S. security policy remains anchored by our alliances with Japan and South Korea. In this sense, the United States, Japan, and South Korea had a unique opportunity as newly-elected South Korean President Lee Myung-bak seemed intent on strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance as well as South Korea's relations with Japan and China. This was important, as the three countries needed to examine how the rise of China and the events unfolding in Russia would impact our alliances, the Secretary underscored.

NEAPSM NOT TO SUPPLANT OR WEAKEN ALLIANCE

110. (S) The Secretary also assured Ishiba that the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (NEAPSM) embodied in the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement would not supplant or weaken our Alliance. The Six-Party process presented a useful mechanism for the main stakeholders in the region to cooperate on a common goal — the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The idea is for the NEAPSM to continue cooperation on a range of other issues, including counterterrorism, nonproliferation, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Ishiba acknowledged the utility of the Six-Party process, noting that he never imagined that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra would perform in Pyongyang.

BMD COOPERATION STRONG, DIFFICULT TO CONVINCE RUSSIA

- 111. (S) Ishiba highlighted the recent successful SM-3 interceptor test by the Japanese AEGIS destroyer Kongo, thanking the United States for strong cooperation in BMD. To make BMD cooperation more effective as a deterrent, the United States and Japan should consider having regional consultations similar to those with NATO. Ishiba noted that he had discussed BMD issues with Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov in Moscow and Tokyo, who expressed reservations about U.S.-Japan BMD cooperation.
- 112. (S) The Secretary also thanked Japan for continued cooperation on BMD, adding that Russia, while skeptical of the U.S.-Japan BMD cooperation and BMD programs in Eastern Europe, would probably welcome a NATO-like discussion. While Russia probably understood that missile defense was more viable today as a nuclear deterrent than during the Cold War because of the missile threat now posed by states like North Korea and Iran, the movement of interceptors to Poland and radars to the Czech Republic remained problematic, the Secretary said. RICE